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RESPONSE 
Data Institutionalism:  
A Reply to Andrew Woods 
Zachary D. Clopton 
In Against Data Exceptionalism, Andrew Keane Woods explores “one of the 
greatest societal and technological shifts in recent years,”1 which manifests in 
the “same old” questions about government power.2 The global cloud is an 
important feature of modern technological life that has significant consequences 
for individual privacy, law enforcement, and governance. Yet, as Woods 
suggests, the legal challenges presented by the cloud have analogies in age-old 
puzzles of public and private international law. 
Identifying these connections is a conceptual advance, and this contribution 
should not be understated. But the most telling statement in Woods’s excellent 
article comes early on: “Showing that the jurisdictional challenges presented by 
the global cloud are not conceptually novel does not resolve those 
problems . . . .”3 Data may not be exceptional, and the legal puzzles posed by data 
sound in existing notions of jurisdiction and conflict of laws. The problem, 
however, is that existing answers to these puzzles are unsatisfying. They are 
unsatisfying in that they do not provide clear answers, but instead pose even 
more challenging normative questions. And they are unsatisfying because some 
consensus answers sit on shaky normative footing. More satisfying answers, I 
contend, require attention to institutions, not just laws. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly summarizes Woods’s core 
conceptual argument: the case against data exceptionalism. This claim has much 
going for it, but it does not provide crisp answers to many of the challenging 
problems of transnational jurisdiction and conflict of laws. Part II then assesses 
what Woods’s thesis tells Congress, the courts, and the executive, and it 
highlights the questions that remain contested when applying his insights. Part 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Special thanks to Kevin Clermont and 
Rebecca Ingber for their feedback on this essay. All errors are mine. 
 1. Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 739 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 765. 
 3. Id. at 735. 
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III concludes by identifying some ways in which a sensitive institutional account 
can improve upon existing approaches to these important questions. 
I. The Argument 
“One of the great regulatory challenges of the Internet era—indeed, one of 
today’s most pressing privacy questions—is how to define the limits of 
government access to personal data stored in the cloud.”4 Woods begins his 
treatment of this great regulatory challenge by describing the practical and legal 
consequences of cloud data. These data present particular challenges because 
they frequently produce jurisdictional conflicts among interested states. To 
make matters worse, Woods offers reasons to doubt that existing mechanisms 
to deal with these conflicts are functioning effectively.5  
Following this clear-eyed descriptive account, Woods turns to his more 
pressing task: explaining why we should not treat data as exceptional. Data are 
intangible, but so are debts. Data are mobile, but so are patents. Data are divisible 
and fungible, but so is money. And so on.6 Indeed, Woods suggests that data cases 
may be less challenging because unlike intangible assets, data have physical 
locations.7 Just ask Apple and the FBI.8 
Having explained why data are not exceptional, Woods examines the 
unexceptional doctrines of jurisdiction and conflict of laws that bear on data 
questions. He relies on the international law of jurisdiction to define the scope 
of substantive law (“prescriptive jurisdiction”) and the reach of courts’ process 
(“enforcement jurisdiction”).9 And he suggests that transnational conflicts over 
data look like common questions in the conflict of laws, which may be answered 
through Brainerd Currie’s balancing of governmental interests (“interest 
analysis”).10 Because data are not exceptional, these existing doctrines offer a 
starting point for resolving the regulatory challenges of the global cloud.11 
 
 4. Id. at 729. 
 5. Id. at 739-54. 
 6. See id. at 756-63 (discussing inter alia the intangibility, mobility, divisibility, and 
fungibility of data).  
 7. Id. at 760-63. 
 8. See, e.g., Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone Without Apple, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1XZ3tLn (discussing the FBI’s efforts to unlock an 
iPhone in the government’s possession). 
 9. Woods, supra note 1, at 764-73. 
 10. Id. at 774-80. 
 11. See id. at 781. 
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II. The Solutions? 
Assuming that the challenges of cloud data are not so dissimilar from 
longstanding issues in transnational law, Part V of Woods’s article asks the next 
logical question: “what should be done?”12 It turns out, however, that asking 
what should be done under existing approaches raises more questions than it 
answers.13 And in so doing, this inquiry highlights reasons to be unsatisfied with 
the existing approaches upon which Woods’s article relies. 
A. Congress 
The first recommendation of Woods’s piece is that Congress should apply 
notions of prescriptive jurisdiction and interest analysis.14 Although Congress 
is not obligated to follow jurisdictional and conflict of laws doctrines,15 it might 
choose to do so as a matter of policy.  
Woods is right to identify Congress as a key institution in managing 
jurisdictional issues with respect to data. But calling on Congress to apply 
notions of prescriptive jurisdiction and interest analysis is just step one. 
Imagine that Congress elects to respect the international law of prescriptive 
jurisdiction. This means that legislation must be tied to one of the 
internationally recognized bases for jurisdiction. So far, so good. But 
international jurisdictional law provides a ceiling, not a floor.16 Calling for 
Congress to voluntarily comply with international jurisdictional law only 
begins the conversation about where, beneath that ceiling, the law should reside.  
Similarly, Congress could adopt a conflict of laws method, but which one? 
Woods prefers interest analysis, but other conflict of laws methodologies are 
 
 12. Id. at 781-88. 
 13. And, as I have argued elsewhere, these data cases serve to highlight the weaknesses that 
are present in current doctrine. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Territoriality, 
Technology, and National Security, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (2016). 
 14. Woods, supra note 1, at 781-85. The international law of prescriptive jurisdiction 
provides the circumstances under which a state may “make its law applicable to the 
activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things.” 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 401 et seq. Interest analysis is a method 
to determine the applicable law championed by Brainerd Currie and the Second 
Restatement of Conflicts. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAW 188 (1963). 
 15. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (“[International law] is not, as 
sometimes is implied, any . . . limitation of the power of Congress.”). 
 16. This is not news to Woods. See, e..g., Woods, supra note 1, at 764 ([“States] can regulate 
acts taking place on their soil as well as acts that affect their citizens, regardless of the 
location of those acts.” (emphasis added)); id. at 769-70 (“‘[A] nation can exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction only against persons or entities with a presence or assets 
within its territory.’” (quoting Jack Goldsmith, Unilateral Regulation of the Internet: A 
Modest Defence, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 135, 139 (2000)) (emphasis added)). 
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regularly practiced in U.S. and foreign jurisdictions.17 The choice of method 
requires a normative judgment about policy tradeoffs. Further, even if we 
assume that Congress would do some sort of interest balancing, it is not clear 
that Congress should follow interest analysis’s advice for courts. Many conflict 
of laws decisions are predicated on the institutional position of courts (as distinct 
from legislatures),18 and it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Congress 
should have wider berth in defining the nature and scope of the interests to be 
balanced.19 
Woods’s application of his general insights to the Electronic 
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) highlights these challenges. Woods 
suggests that Congress should reform ECPA to remove its “blocking statute” 
effects.20 Putting aside the hazy boundary between disrespectable blocking 
statutes and legitimate expressions of substantive preferences, there is much to 
like in Woods’s proposal. But it must be acknowledged that it depends on 
normative priors. Woods writes that “the aim of these [proposed] requirements 
is not to dictate as a normative matter how such requests for data ought to be 
processed, but rather to design the system to maximize appreciation of state 
interests and minimize conflicts.”21 This, of course, is a normative statement in 
itself—it is not a foregone conclusion that the law should “maximize 
appreciation of state interests and minimize conflicts.”22 Moreover, the 
proposed four-pronged test is just one conflicts approach to answering these 
questions—other conflicts models may select other factors, or may give them 
different weights. This approach is only justified if it coheres with background 
normative commitments not fully developed herein Woods’s article. 
Returning to the general, Woods is correct to suggest that Congress should 
balance foreign and domestic interests. And centuries of conflict of laws 
thinking may provide Congress with helpful ways to address these issues. But 
merely labeling this as a conflicts problem does not actually balance the 
 
 17. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie: An 
End and a Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847 (surveying state conflict of laws 
methodologies). This is not news to Woods either. He frequently observes that conflicts 
doctrine poses multiple answers to the same question. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 1, at 
756-57 (noting multiple approaches to situs for intangibles); id. at 777-78 (criticizing 
courts unpredictably relying on the “notoriously malleable concept of international 
comity”). 
 18. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990) 
(approaching choice of law in light of a conceptualized bargain among state lawmakers). 
 19. Cf. Zachary D. Clopton & P. Bartholomew Quintans, Extraterritoriality and Comparative 
Institutional Analysis: A Response to Professor Meyer, 102 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 28 (2013) 
(suggesting reasons to give weaker extraterritorial effect to common-law rules than 
statutory ones). 
 20. Woods, supra note 1, at 781. 
 21. Id. at 782. 
 22. Id. This goal may be even less important for legislatures than for judges (for whom 
minimizing conflicts also has a separation of powers justification). See infra Part III. 
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competing interests for ECPA amendments or other related regulatory 
challenges. Instead, it poses normative questions that demand normative 
theories (and perhaps substantial amounts of empirical data). 
B. The Courts 
Recognizing that Congress may not rewrite ECPA immediately, Woods’s 
second recommendation suggests how courts should resolve disputes regarding 
ECPA’s reach. Again, Woods’s institutional diagnosis is spot on. Courts 
frequently need to interpret statutes where the intended territorial reach is 
unclear. To answer this question, Woods reasonably proposes a three-step 
approach applying a presumption against extraterritoriality: (1) does the statute 
have extraterritorial reach?; (2) are these data in fact extraterritorial?; and 
(3) how should interest analysis affect the decision?23  
Woods makes an important contribution in identifying the proper 
questions, but current approaches to each question produce inconclusive 
answers. First, even if we accepted that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is the optimal tool of statutory interpretation, different 
jurists apply the presumption differently.24 And, as I have explained elsewhere, 
this presumption rests on weak normative footing.25 Instead of resting on 
existing doctrine, perhaps the salience of data cases could spur efforts to reform 
this doctrine.  
The second question is whether these data should be treated as 
extraterritorial. Reasonable minds differ over whether these data are 
extraterritorial under the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank.26 Indeed, that is what the tech companies and government 
lawyers are fighting about in these cases.27 And, again, it is far from clear that 
Morrison’s approach to this question is the right one.28 
Third, although Woods’s suggestion that courts apply interest analysis to 
federal statutes has intuitive appeal, it stands in marked contrast to the way that 
the Supreme Court has answered these questions in recent cases. As Caleb Nelson 
 
 23. Woods, supra note 1, at 785-86. 
 24. Consider the multiple opinions in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 
(2010), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), especially in light of the 
Court’s changing composition. 
 25. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 26. 561 U.S. 247, 266-69 (applying the presumption against extraterritoriality only when the 
conduct comprising the “focus” of the statute is extraterritorial).  
 27. See Woods, supra note 1, at 731-32 (describing litigation). 
 28. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of American 
Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655 (2011) (criticizing the indeterminacy of Morrison); Clopton, 
Replacing, supra note 25 (same). 
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put it, “[w]hen the modern Supreme Court invokes the ‘presumption against 
extraterritoriality,’ . . .  it does not appear to have current choice-of-law 
jurisprudence in mind.”29 So Woods’s suggestion to apply conflicts law to this 
dispute would require a significant departure from current law. 
Even assuming that conflict of laws analysis applied, the focus on 
reciprocity is a bit startling.30 For one thing, most U.S. jurisdictions do not apply 
reciprocity to foreign judgments, and even in those jurisdictions that do, 
reciprocity is not applied to the interpretation of federal statutes or to the reach 
of U.S. legal instruments.31 So at a minimum, this proposal is beginning to look 
a little exceptional. Moreover, the decision whether to adopt a reciprocity rule 
has many characteristics of classically political issues left to the political 
branches.32 The mere fact that reciprocity exists as a matter of judge-made law 
in some jurisdictions does not resolve the political question whether it is the 
normatively preferable approach.33 
C. The Executive Branch 
Woods’s last two recommendations are that mutual legal assistance (MLA) 
procedures should be strengthened and that calls for a global treaty should be 
resisted.34 At the risk of sounding like a broken record, there is a lot to like in 
these proposals and in their implicit institutional analysis—the executive branch 
must be central in making and executing policy in transnational law 
enforcement. 
I will add only a brief comment. Although Woods’s proposed MLA reforms 
seem facially reasonable,35 it would be unfair to suggest that they are costless. 
 
 29. Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 721-22 (2013). Nelson speculates that this reflects the “fragmented” 
state of current choice-of-law jurisprudence or the Supreme Court's “distaste for the 
content of that jurisprudence.” Id. at 722. Neither sounds good for Woods. 
 30. Woods, supra note 1, at 778 (suggesting that a reciprocity rule “could easily be applied to 
the context of cloud data”). 
 31. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 1094-1102 (5th ed. 2011). 
 32. Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2016). 
 33. Woods also suggests that his conflicts analysis is valuable because it can deliver outcomes 
that are “the same across service providers.” Woods, supra note 1, at 786. But as noted 
above, conflicts doctrine is not uniform. Indeed, interest analysis likely would be less 
predictable than clear rules against which parties could negotiate. This is not to suggest 
that rules are preferable to standards in this area. See Clopton, Territoriality, supra note 
13, at 62-63 (suggesting that standards may be preferable in some cases involving 
technology). But arguments for standards rely on more than predictability. 
 34. Woods, supra note 1, at 786-88. 
 35. See id. at 786-87. 
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Each proposed reform creates direct costs and opportunity costs.36 Devoting 
resources to MLA reform means that we are taking resources from another 
project, and it is not obvious that MLA is the top priority for limited 
government resources. Indeed, given how “straightforward” these proposals 
seem,37 it would not be unreasonable to think that executive actors have 
eschewed these reforms because they consciously defined other priorities. For 
better or worse, answering these questions of law-enforcement resource 
allocation is canonically an executive-branch function. 
III. An Institutional Approach 
The foregoing review has suggested that even if legislative, judicial, and 
executive actors accepted international principles of jurisdiction and conflict of 
laws, we should expect to face many unanswered questions calling out for 
normative judgments. Organizing this review around the three branches was 
intentional. An institutional analysis centered on the separation of powers 
informs these normative judgments by suggesting which branches should 
answer these questions and how they might go about doing so.38 
First, the separation of powers suggests a division of labor between the work 
of courts resolving bilateral disputes and the work of the political branches 
making system-wide, polycentric choices.39 This division reflects 
considerations of both institutional authority and institutional capacity.40 As 
applied to questions in Woods’s article, that means we should look to Congress 
and the executive branch to define the extraterritorial reach of SCA warrants, 
provide reciprocity rules, or invigorate MLA efforts. Or not—the political 
branches could exercise their institutional prerogatives to decline these 
invitations, and those decisions would reflect normative commitments that are 
the product of their institutional judgment.41 
Second, the separation of powers does not imply three hermetically sealed 
branches. Particularly given the complex, evolving questions at the intersection 
of national security and technology, reforms that promote inter-branch 
coordination could be encouraged.42 This logic favors coordinated approaches 
 
 36. See id. Arguably they present tradeoffs with respect to security as well: query whether 
digitization, increased staff, and transparency increase the risk of unintended 
disclosures.  
 37. Id. at 787. 
 38. Federalism also may have something to say about these proposals, but that is beyond the 
scope of this Essay. See Clopton, Judging Foreign States, supra note 32, at _. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Notably, the separation of powers does not shut out international law—it just filters its 
influence through an institutional analysis. See id.  
 42. See Clopton, Territoriality, supra note 13, at 62-63. 
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to stored communications and surveillance authorities, and disfavors doctrines 
that call for one or more branches to abdicate their role in the separation of 
powers.43 And, again, it calls upon the branches to take up their shared-but-
differentiated responsibilities in keeping with their institutional authorities and 
capacities. 
Finally, this separation of powers analysis calls back to the initial question 
regarding data exceptionalism. Woods is probably correct that many data cases 
are not exceptional. However, our separation of powers structure implies that 
this is a question ultimately posed to the political branches (within 
constitutional limits). So even if data cases should not be exceptional, that does 
not mean that Congress cannot pass laws that treat them as such, and it does not 
mean that executive officials cannot make decisions about priorities with data 
exceptionalism in mind. For better or worse, policy choices have created 
countless exceptions in the face of arguments against exceptionalism: foreign 
defamation cases are exceptional for judgment recognition;44 Cuban citizens are 
exceptional in immigration;45 Washington, D.C., is exceptional in the 
Constitution;46 and a single case against the Central Bank of Iran is exceptional 
for foreign sovereign immunity.47  
Woods argues ably that policymakers should not elect to create data 
exceptions. I hope that they are listening. But this is just the first step in a process 
of policymaking that is—and should be—governed by unexceptional 
institutional relationships. 
 
 43. Id.  
 44. See 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2013). 
 45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2013). 
 46. See U.S. CONST., amend. XXIII. 
 47. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2013); see generally Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) 
(describing this statute and confirming its constitutionality). 
